



LIVING WITH CHINA DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN REGIONAL STATES AND CHINA

8–9 March 2007 ||
Singapore ||



LIVING WITH CHINA DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN REGIONAL STATES AND CHINA

REPORT ON A CONFERENCE ORGANIZED BY
THE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (RSIS)

**8–9 March 2007
Singapore**

AIMS OF THE CONFERENCE

Much of the debate regarding the “China Problem” has been not only Western-centric but also heavily theory driven. There have been conspicuously insufficient regional voices in the debate. Arguably, regional states should be most sensitive to China’s strategic thinking and behaviours, making them most qualified to discuss their relationship with a rising China.

In accordance with this belief, we invited more than a dozen scholars from regional states to discuss the interactions between China and its neighbours. The papers and discussions at the conference focused on the following major points:

- How have regional states reacted to some of China’s major policy initiatives or behaviours? How do regional states judge the nature, the intention and the strategic rationale behind China’s regional strategy?
- Have there been major turning points or merely minor adjustments in regional states’ policies towards China? What has been the major strategic thinking (or re-thinking) behind regional states’ policies towards China?
- How do regional states’ policy elites assess their own countries’ China policy? What are the major lessons they draw for their own countries and for China in managing their interactions?
- How has China reacted to some of the major policy changes or initiatives from regional states, either individually or collectively? To what extent has China been a “responsible power”?
- What are the implications for the region, in terms of regional order, of these dynamic interactions with China? What are the implications for other great powers?

OPENING REMARKS



KWA CHONG GUAN GIVING THE WELCOME SPEECH

In his opening address, **Mr. Kwa Chong Guan** welcomed the conference participants and made three interrelated points pertaining to the salience of living with China. The first point,

according to him, is that we tend to categorize in our mental compartments how a rising power behaves, remarking that such an understanding of current trends can turn out to be problematic as we often assign China to either the category of a benign power or that of a rising threat.

Second, how do we make sense of the information that is available to us, and use it to help us distinguish deed from word? It is only through acute discernment that we can actualize words into deeds. Third, it is the deeper social memories that we have to contend with and try to look at how China perceives its position in history with respect to the world. The metaphors, images and symbols of the past do suggest how importantly China views itself, given the photographs of Chinese artefacts that Kwa showed the audience.

In conclusion, Kwa reminded that as we begin to reconfigure our understanding of China, the latter is also reviewing where it stands in history, and that will subsequently affect future relations for the global community.

PANEL ONE

THE ORIGINS OF CHINA'S PROACTIVE REGIONAL STRATEGY

Presenter: Li Mingjiang
Moderator: Jae Ho Chung
Discussants: Sheng Lijun, Chih-yu Shih



CHIH-YU SHIH MAKING COMMENTS

The paper presented by **Li Mingjiang** focused on the changes in China's regional foreign policy framework in the past decade or so. Li argued that China's new proactive engagement policy is related to its domestic economic development, "hedging" against U.S. encirclement and the "pulling" of regional states. At the strategic level, China's new regional policy aims to reduce tensions with its neighbours, build up political trust in the region and reassure its neighbours of its benign intentions. This behaviour can be clearly seen in recent years in China's relations with individual neighbouring states as well as Beijing's participation in multilateral (regional) institutions.

Li concluded that China's new regional policy is likely to continue in the foreseeable future since the two conditions—domestic economic priority and the U.S. strategic competition—are likely to persist. Particularly, U.S. strategic pressure on China is unlikely to abate. In fact, as China rises, more conflict and mutual suspicion in Sino-U.S. relations may be in the offing. Beijing will have to continue to consolidate its strategic backyard and constantly send political signals to Washington that China can be trusted in this region.

Discussion

Sheng Lijun commented that, while Li's paper may serve as a good review of the new development in China's regional policy, some new viewpoints needed to be further elaborated and expanded. In addition, Sheng noted that the Taiwan issue is not mentioned in the paper. He also stated that it would be preferable not to quote too much from remarks by Chinese leaders. However, if it is really necessary, one should at least add more critical interpretations to the quotes. He also suggested more discretion in choosing words in order to make more balanced arguments.

For **Chih-yu Shih**, Li's paper is a reflection of changes in the regional environment as well as the strategic imperatives of China's foreign policy, which does indicate certain insights regarding the dynamics between China and its neighbours. The change also suggests China's desire for a new national identity. He pointed out that it is improbable that China can win the contest of soft power against American hegemony in the current era.

Other members of the floor questioned the usage of the word "hedging" that was applied to China as the term is usually used to describe how small states try to balance against more powerful ones, which is not so relevant in the case of China.

PANEL TWO

THE PLA'S ROLE IN CHINA'S REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Presenter:	Qi Dapeng
Moderator:	Joseph Liow
Discussants:	Tang Shiping Richard Bitzinger

Colonel **Qi Dapeng's** paper focused on the role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in China's regional security strategy. According to Qi, in order to maintain the momentum of domestic socio-economic development, the PLA has developed a new perspective in its doctrine towards the region. Qi proposed five guiding principles that underlie the PLA's national security strategy.

First, China has cultivated a new conceptual framework featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit and equality, as well as coordination. Second, China opposes the realist framework of power politics in the international political and economic order, and instead initiates the building of a "democratic, harmonious, just and tolerant" world based on the interdependence of nations under regional integration and globalization.

Third, China rejects any belligerent and aggressive approach in its rise to power and prefers to take the road of peaceful development. Fourth, great importance is attached to nurturing good relations with neighbouring states. Finally, in dealing with territorial disputes, China holds firm that it has indisputable sovereignty over those areas. However, it continues to insist on the principle of "putting aside differences and developing the region jointly".

Thus, the aforementioned guidelines adopted by China not only indicate its changing attitude towards its neighbours, but also reflect China's willingness to preserve common development as well as a win-win situation for its national development strategy, national security strategy and national defence strategy.

Discussion

Tang Shiping thought that the paper could elaborate more on what constitutes China's development interests, especially from the perspective of the Chinese leadership, as these interests can be subject to different interpretations. While Qi singled out certain issues, such as the strategic differences between China and Taiwan, and China-U.S. rivalry, this might be deemed as too inclined towards a great power-centric mentality and therefore missed out the relevance of other regional states (for example, Southeast Asia). Another area is to look at how the PLA can reconcile the inherent tensions that exist in its offensive posture on the Taiwan issue as well as its offensive capacity seen from the perspective of small regional states.

Richard Bitzinger noted that China's regional policy is becoming more sophisticated and nuanced, as seen in its increasing involvement in both regional and global commitments. The larger question, however, is whether China is truly sincere in being a responsible power or if there are hidden motives being implicated? Bitzinger also agreed with Tang that one must learn how to deal with the inevitable tension that results from the soft-power approach taken by China, while it is also evident that China is spending much more resources in upgrading its military. He contended that the PLA could do a much better job in making clear its intent and therefore avoid any misunderstanding or cause for concern that China may be adopting an offensive stance.

Leszek Buszynski expressed concerns in the reasons behind China's growing investment in its military modernization. He also echoed that it would be in the PLA's interest to be more transparent in what it is doing in order to reassure other states of its benign interests. He also commented on China's energy competition with other emerging powers, the need for military cooperation and the importance of regional multilateralism, and the problems in China-Japan relations. Kwa Chong Guan highlighted that the heart of the matter lies in the Chinese civil-military relations.

PANEL THREE

RUSSIA

Presenter: Alexander Lukin
Moderator: Qi Dapeng
Discussants: Leszek Buszynski
Tang Shiping



ALEXANDER LUKIN PRESENTING HIS PAPER

The gist of **Alexander Lukin's** presentation was to illustrate the complexity of Sino-Russian relations given the problems encountered in different aspects. It was also an attempt to show that, despite these difficulties, both Beijing and Moscow have over time tried to manage some of the most salient issues regarding their bilateral relations. In fact, Lukin pointed out that current relations between the two countries are believed to be at their highest point of development, arguably even better than that during the communist era of the 1950s.

Lukin explained that the present rapprochement between Russia and China is, to a great extent, spurred by the anxieties over the international situation, in particular, U.S. policies, which both countries share. These include attempts to diminish the role of the United Nations and sideline the Security Council, the policy of NATO enlargement and of its

assuming some functions of the Security Council, intervention into conflicts within sovereign states under humanitarian pretexts, Washington's abrogation of the 1972 IBM treaty with Moscow, and its reluctance to join a number of important international treaties.

Lukin also elaborated on a few outstanding problems between China and Russia, particularly those relating to immigration and border demarcation, Russian oil export to Japan, and trade imbalances, all of which would have caused misunderstanding between the two parties in one way or another. However, so far, the prospects of resolving these issues are quite encouraging, and the crux is for the Russian government to adopt a more consistent policy towards China, by first making efforts to control the local authorities and settle its own domestic problems. Regardless of the difficulties faced by Moscow, China has shown great understanding towards the Moscow's concerns.

Discussion

Leszek Buszynski commented that Lukin presented some interesting and informative views on China. However, there are also some possible tensions, such as Russia's concern that it may gradually be overshadowed by China's economic rise as well as the extension of American influence in Asia. Other issues to be explored are border disputes, the pipeline agreement with Japan and arms sales to China, all of which have serious implications for regional security. As the Chinese become more independent and will no longer depend on Russia for arms support, the bilateral relations may become more problematic.

Tang Shiping felt that a more coherent explanation is needed to account for the intricacies of Sino-Russian relations, and a section may be required on why the two states are unable to resolve certain issues despite their convergence in interests and joint balancing against the United States. Notwithstanding the annual growth in trade between the two countries, China's evolving perception of Russia is another potential factor in shaping future diplomatic relations between the two parties.

PANEL FOUR

INDIA

Presenter: Swaran Singh
Moderator: Haruko Satoh
Discussants: Rajesh Basrur
Zhang Guihong



SWARAN SINGH MAKING A PRESENTATION

Swaran Singh began his talk by focusing on contemporary events between the two countries, primarily on the following aspects. First, scholars have categorized various constituents of Indian debates on China using several variables of time, space and orientations. To assess it in terms of time, India's China debate has been examined in different phases: for example, post-independence, post-1962 war, post-rapprochement, post-1998 nuclear tests and so on. Similarly, the nature and scope of India's focus on China vary in different regions of India and overseas Indian experts on China can also be put into a separate category. In terms of their orientation, various schools have been categorized as hawks, doves, owls or, more specifically, sinophiles and sinophobes and so on. Then there are those who classify India's China debate among pragmatists, hyperrealists and appeasers while others call these groups mainstream, China-is-not-threat and China-is-threat factions.

Secondly, Indian perceptions of China can also be viewed through institutional lineages and legacies in terms of views held by successive occupants in Indian ministries of defence, foreign affairs, interior and, more recently, those working in the prime minister's office, which has lately centralized all foreign

policy-making, especially in critical areas of national significance. Perspectives may also be categorized among those representing official, academic, NGOs or business communities that seem to respectively emphasize on issues of agreements and statistics of either trade or defence expenditures. And here, while some describe this as a reflection of the essential plurality of life and discourse in Indian society, others see this as a glaring absence of a coherent China policy.

However, the more recent and popular side of the great Indian debate on China—especially in public media—continue to show limitations of classifying China into stereotypes debating India-China ties in terms of conflict and/or cooperation. This is so especially at the grassroots level, where the image of China continues to be one of mysterious, unfathomable, inscrutable and threatening nation. In short, Singh argued that the future prospects for Sino-India relations are likely to remain friendly rather than competitive despite these competing perceptions. India does not view its relations with other countries on an "either-or" basis. Rather, it actively pursues a mutually beneficial scheme with as many cooperative partners as possible, extending its network of allies at the same time. It is their mutual confidence building that has since come to be the hallmark of India-China ties.

Discussion

Rajesh Basrur felt it was necessary to include the issues of terrorism and how China sees this relationship with India and Pakistan on that count. Also, there exist complexities at a higher level of competition in the area of border disputes, and if Singh could show how these two countries actually manage their relations after the 1962 war, the author might have a stronger argument for his paper.

Zhang Guihong proposed to establish an analytical model that can better examine domestic and external factors affecting diplomatic ties between the two countries. Domestic factors would include social movements, economic growth and the stability of the political regime. Zhang also asked what the concrete examples are in India's foreign policy in dealing with a rising China. As for external factors, how has American influence affected India-China ties?

Kwa Chong Guan brought up several interesting points based on his experiences in India and Bhutan, where he saw a remarkable level of military presence at the borders, hence suggesting things that are happening on the ground may be more than what Singh has presented in his paper.

PANEL FIVE

PAKISTAN

Presenter: Fazal-ur-Rahman
Moderator: Tang Shiping
Discussants: Swaran Singh
Zhang Guihong



ZHANG GUIHONG SPEAKING AT THE CONFERENCE

Fazal-ur-Rahman noted that over the last five to six years, there has been a new dimension in the diplomatic ties between Pakistan and China, going beyond political and military cooperation. He said that Pakistan is perhaps one of a few countries that are most comfortable and have no apprehensions about the rise of China. Since the early 1960s, Pakistan and China have enjoyed a very friendly and cordial relationship, one that is based on mutual trust and respect for each other's interests.

In sum, the following conclusions were drawn during the presentation regarding the Chinese-Pakistani proactive engagement with respect to the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks within the regional context.

First, there are no indications suggesting a change in China's overall policy towards South Asia in the aftermath of the Kargil War and developments following the events of 9/11. The Chinese concept of strategic stability may be affected by the

evolving Indo-U.S. strategic alliance with a strong component of defence and nuclear cooperation. However, China will make efforts to maintain the strategic balance in South Asia. Second, China's diplomatic role during the India-Pakistan military stand-off is worth examining. In this case, China's neutrality was somewhat different from that of Kargil, as it was relatively more proactive neutrality. Third, China welcomed Pakistan-U.S. normalization of relations, as the United States has substantively helped Pakistan's socio-economic sector development. China also can enhance its contribution towards Pakistan's development without raising much concern in the United States or India. Fourth, in both crises, China, through its skilful diplomacy, has been able to mend its relations with India and the United States, respectively. Pakistan understood well the rationale behind the Chinese policy.

Overall, China's responsible and mature diplomacy based on the aforementioned developments in South Asia clearly shows that China has emerged as a factor of stability in the region. Pakistan places great importance to its relations with China and both see this traditional relationship flourishing in the future.

Discussion

Swaran Singh commented that Fazal's paper reflected an objective study on Pakistan-China relations and is certainly very detailed in its description. However, Singh named a few internationally renowned scholars in the related field whom Fazal could have cited in his paper. On a few occasions, there were certain expressions in the paper that seemed to be questionable and warranted further substantiation.

Zhang Guihong thought that although Fazal made some reasonable claims, improvements could be made in addressing the loopholes in the paper. For instance, how does Pakistan perceive China's foreign policy in South Asia in general? What gives rise to the momentum of bilateral activities between the two countries during peaceful times, and how would such a momentum be affected in a possible conflict scenario? One can also investigate some other broader issues like economic and cultural exchanges so as to examine how contacts between people from Pakistan and China can be better facilitated.

PANEL SIX

THE PHILIPPINES

Presenter: Aileen Baviera
Moderator: Alexander Vuving
Discussants: Joseph Liow
Ho Khai Leong



AILEEN BAVIERA PRESENTING HER PAPER

Aileen Baviera argued that despite the dissimilarity and asymmetry in the relations between the Philippines and China, both share important convergences in the geo-strategic environment, seen especially in their membership in regional institutions like the ARF and ASEAN+3. In addition, it is important for China to understand the nature of Philippine-U.S. relations as it can profoundly affect China's view of the Philippines and its greater relevance for the region.

China's importance to the Philippines is quite evident and is, for the most part, no different from how other regional states value China as an engine of economic growth as well as an important player in global and regional affairs. The Philippines may be deemed strategically important to China for at least three reasons: (a) it is a founding and influential member of ASEAN; (b) it is formally a military ally of the United States (dubbed a "major non-NATO ally"); and (c) it flanks Taiwan geographically. Moreover, setting aside geopolitical interests, the Philippines and China do share some common norms and values with respect to their views of the unfolding international order that can underpin future cooperative relations.

Although economic interdependence is crucial in driving bilateral ties forward, the crux of the issue lies in how China sees itself in relation to the rest of ASEAN. The dispute concerning the Mischief Reef Incident is a good case study in examining the nature of the Philippines' perception of China and vice versa. In Manila as well as in its frontline province of Palawan, there are very real concerns about a China challenge to security of the Philippine archipelago, in particular as affected by their proximity and the shared ocean environment. Manila appears to pursue three tracks for managing its disputes with China: (a) bilateral engagement focused on confidence-building measures and finding ways to cooperate; (b) multilateral dialogues through ASEAN addressed towards sustaining low-level pressure on China and binding it to norms of behaviour; and (c) keeping the military alliance with the United States ready just in case the first two are unsuccessful.

Discussion

Joseph Liow mentioned a few empirical and conceptual points that could better improve Baviera's paper. It was not obvious how the author had effectively defined the Philippines' national interests during its encounters of conflict with China, as well as the actual goals of the former's foreign policy. Liow pointed out the absence of a concrete attempt to theorize how the Philippines can improve its relations with China. He contended that China tends to appeal to smaller states that are more eager to stand up against American hegemony in economic, political and cultural aspects. Clearly, China is very well aware of such a development in Southeast Asia where anti-Americanism is manifested in its most virulent forms.

Ho Khai Leong mentioned that the inconsistencies in both China's and the Philippines' foreign policy behaviours as highlighted by the author deserved deeper analysis. This is because the problem of regime security has always been a pertinent topic for both countries and, if properly understood, can resolve other related puzzles about the future of democratic progress for these two countries. Perhaps the most important question to consider is this: When do sour political relations start to affect robust economic relations? Given the Mischief Reef Incident as well as Taiwan's constant appeal for political support, how will these developments affect China's attitude towards the Philippines? Similarly, the Philippines will start to change its view of China as the latter steadily makes itself the de facto leading influence within the region.

PANEL SEVEN

MALAYSIA AND THAILAND

Presenters: Mohamed Nawab
Joseph Liow
Moderator: Li Mingjiang
Discussants: Tan Seng Chye
Ho Khai Leong



TAN SENG CHYE COMMENTING ON A PAPER

The presentation was divided into three parts by first looking at relations during the Cold War, focusing particularly on the content of Thai and Malaysian threat perceptions with respect to China and the corresponding responses; the emergence of China as a rising power and how that has affected the policy stances of both Malaysia and Thailand in their adjustments to changing geo-strategic realities; and finally, assessments of the state of diplomatic relations between China and the two ASEAN states, and their impact on international relations in Southeast Asia.

According to the two authors, during the Cold War, a major source of anxiety for a number of Southeast Asian states was the impact of having significant ethnic Chinese minorities within their territorial boundaries. However, the strategic imperative became more obvious as the international world

order shifted from being a bipolar to a unipolar one, giving both Malaysia and Thailand the impetus to develop closer ties with China. A large part of the reason was also due to ASEAN's realization to counter-balance American presence in the region by strongly advocating for China to be included as an ASEAN dialogue partner in 1994. This was accentuated by the fact that the communist threat was no longer pertinent, coupled with the meteoric rise of China's economy and the corresponding opportunities presented for the region. Improvement in China's ties with Southeast Asia, not least of all with Malaysia and Thailand, has also been facilitated by China's "Charm Offensive".

The conclusion is that small states like Thailand and Malaysia do not need to bandwagon just because they have no choice, but it may be because they choose to do it for the sake of benefits.

Discussion

Tan Seng Chye complimented the paper for its well-researched materials and for being comprehensive in its scope. He further added that in order to better understand China's relations with Thailand, one must hearken back to the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1977, which prompted Thailand to solidify its diplomatic ties with the Chinese, also known as "bamboo diplomacy". Malaysia, according to Tan, has, however, taken a more cautious stance towards China and the paper performed its aim of demonstrating that. In essence, the paper could probably explain in greater detail what actually happened on the ground, in addition to the existing information already given.

Ho Khai Leong felt that the paper needed to be more integrated in its argument, as the conclusion seemed to reveal two different approaches. Furthermore, the theorizing that was introduced at the end of the paper was apparently misplaced as the topic of the conference was more concerned about "living with China" rather than about small states balancing against greater powers. Lastly, there was also a lack of analysis in cross-straits relations between China and Taiwan.

PANEL EIGHT

THE ECONOMICS OF CHINA'S REGIONAL ROLE

Presenter: Liang Ruobing
Moderator: Alexander Lukin
Discussants: Sarah Tong
Li Mingjiang



LIANG RUOBING PRESENTING HIS PAPER

Liang Ruobing focused his presentation on China's economic relations with ASEAN countries, in particular

the China-ASEAN free trade agreement. Using the China-ASEAN FTA as an example, Liang expanded his analysis to the economic integration in the whole East Asian region. His arguments were based not only on the economic dimension, as seen in his running the gravity model to test the economic rationale of the China-ASEAN FTA, but also built on taking some political factors in account. Liang attempted to capture the interactions between the economic and political/security factors.

Discussion

Sarah Tong commented that there is a serious flaw in using the China-ASEAN FTA as an example since the FTA is still in progress. This challenges the validity of the results of the gravity model that Liang used in his analysis. Tong also mentioned that Liang missed a few other important variables, such as China's acceptance into the WTO, in his empirical study.

Li Mingjiang commented on the structure of the paper and offered suggestions for further improvement. He also suggested that the author compare the results of his gravity model with those that have been done by other scholars.

PANEL NINE

SOUTH KOREA

Presenter: Jae Ho Chung
Moderator: Liang Ruobing
Discussants: Heungkyu Kim
Tang Shiping



JAE HO CHUNG PRESENTING HIS PAPER

Jae Ho Chung stressed three main points at the beginning of his presentation. He suggested that South Korea's mode of response to a rising China is not static but rather one that is evolving. Then he introduced the unanticipated strategic dilemma that had been caused by the very success of Seoul's full engagement with Beijing. Finally, he suggested that it was plausible South Korea might enter into a phase of "reawakening" in terms of constructing its relations with China.

Chung provided the backgrounds as to why China has been viewed so positively and favourably in South Korea by applying a realist, liberalist and constructivist perspective. He then discussed the recent "change of atmosphere" that came to adversely affect Seoul's perceptions of Beijing and which, according to Chung, might generate a downhill turn for the bilateral relationship. He argued that negative views of China were seen in the business communities' worry of China's increasing economic competitiveness, the rapidly expanding trade dependency of South Korea on China, and Korea's normative considerations about China's human-rights record. Furthermore, he highlighted South Korea's rising doubts concerning China's will and determination to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.

In the third part of his presentation, Chung drew upon the Koguryo controversy as a potential critical turning point for Sino-South Korean relations. He stressed that China's claim of the Dynasty of Koguryo belonging wholly to Chinese history has brought about strong anti-Chinese sentiments among South Koreans.

He argued that there are both positive and negative elements to influence the future of bilateral ties with China. Finally, he pointed out South Korea's potential mode of "living with China" could either turn out to be a symbiosis or cohabitation. South Korea, as a smaller middle-level power, he concluded, has preferred to remain symbiotic with China, both economically and diplomatic. But he also stated that, given the role of asymmetry in international politics, it would be more up to China whether the relationship could remain symbiotic.

Discussion

Heungkyu Kim commented that Chung perhaps dramatized the relationship between China and South Korea a bit. He argued that, contrary to Chung's perception, the relationship between the United States, South Korea and China is not necessarily a zero-sum game. Furthermore, he stressed that within South Korea, there was a widening gap between the public and the government perception of China. He then suggested that the surveys Chung drew upon as an indicator of growing anti-China sentiments in the Korean society were actually not comparable. Furthermore, he suggested further elaborations on the policy implications for Korea. In concluding, he stressed that, unlike what was indicated by Chung, it is still too early to conclude that the outcome of current trends in Sino-South Korean relations are bound to be negative.

Tang Shiping made the general statement that more powerful countries also have a greater responsibility in taking care of smaller countries but at the same time emphasized that "it takes two to dance". He suggested that the author further elaborates on the two countries' ways to contain the exacerbation of a crisis.

Also referring to the Koguryo controversy, another participant suggested that China's activities should be viewed in a wider context. She raised the issue of whether China's claims in this respect were possibly a way for it to legitimize its participation in the six-party talk.

PANEL TEN

JAPAN



HARUKO SATOH PRESENTING HER PAPER

Presenter: Haruko Satoh
Moderator: Swaran Singh
Discussants: Chih-yu Shih
Lam Peng Er

Haruko Satoh emphasized that while Prime Minister Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine had plunged Sino-Japanese relationships to a new low, it had the unintended consequences of facilitating a genuine debate on Japan's identity and its future in Asia. Satoh cautioned, however, that this debate may be a very long process.

Discussion

Chih-yu Shih and **Lam Peng Er** agreed that a debate about Japan's identity and its future in Asia is ongoing and may take some time to really settle. They, however, pointed out that such a debate might not lead to an outcome that would help the Sino-Japanese relationship and East Asian regionalism.

PANEL ELEVEN

INDONESIA

Presenter: Rizal Sukma
Moderator: Fazal-ur-Rahman
Discussants: Leonard Sebastian
Tan See Seng

Rizal Sukma began his presentation with an overview of the main historic developments since the establishment of official diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China in July 1950. According to him, the first period, between 1950 and 1967, was replete with problems and suspicion, and culminated in Indonesia's decision to freeze diplomatic ties in October 1967 over the conviction that Beijing's interference in Indonesia's domestic affairs could no longer be tolerated. Diplomatic relations were finally restored in 1990 in what Sukma called "passive reengagement".

He argued that the passive nature of reengagement was due to a number of rather sensitive and, until then, unresolved issues. He identified four main characteristics of the relationship during this period. First, during the anti-Chinese riots in 1994, the China Ministry of Foreign Affairs' statement of "concern", calling Jakarta to defuse the situation was considered as interference into Indonesia's internal affairs by its government. Second, Indonesia tended to take a cautious and wait-and-see approach in developing its newly restored relations with China. Third, an immediate improvement in bilateral relations was also delayed by the persistent ambiguity in Indonesia's perception of China. And fourth, despite the slow progress in the political-security front, Indonesia-China relations have experienced a steady growth in economic cooperation.

Moving on to the period from 1998, Sukma touched on subsequent signs of improvements and closer cooperation



RIZAL SUKMA PRESENTING HIS PAPER

addressing, the reasons for this changing point in Indonesia-China relations. He argued that dramatic changes in Indonesian politics since May 1998 and China's "good neighbouring" policy and "charming diplomacy" towards Southeast Asia have allowed the two countries to pursue significant improvements in bilateral relations. In this context, he explicitly stressed China's sensitive management of the May 1998 riots, which was not considered as interference into its internal affairs by Indonesia, as an important turning point for the gradual improvement of their relationship.

However, Sukma argued that China's charming diplomacy is not sufficient enough yet to establish confidence within Indonesia. He rather stressed that Indonesia's relations

with China—despite recent improvements—would also be influenced by factors emanating from Indonesia's domestic politics, including the problem of Indonesia's perceptions of ethnic Chinese and the primacy of economic requirements.

Discussion

Leonard Sebastian introduced the aspect of the U.S. impact on Sino-Indonesian relations. He drew on experiences in the multilateral arena such as WTO negotiations where China has proved to be much more supportive to Indonesia's interests than the United States. In this respect, he stated that the United States seemed to promote the welfare of stock-trading people while China seemed promote the welfare of working people. He noted that China's veto in the UN was considered in favour of developing countries and concluded that at the present stage China has been more important for Indonesia in bilateral partnerships than the United States.

Tan See Seng stressed the point made by Sukma that recent improvements in Sino-Indonesian relations were a result of both internal improvements in Indonesia, especially its democratization process as well as China's charming policy towards its neighbours. He further underlined that democratization in general helps to pacify the tie with an authoritarian state. He concluded that under President Yudhoyono, China has been considered an important economic partner in Indonesia's post-crisis recovery process. According to him, Indonesia's primary concern has been its own economic development. Therefore, in dealing with China, economic interests are put forth over security concerns.

PANEL TWELVE

VIETNAM

Presenter:	Alexander Vuving
Moderator:	Aileen Baviera
Discussants:	Tan See Seng Tan Seng Chye

Alexander Vuving attempted to explain the two major shifts in Sino-Vietnamese relations he had identified: the signing of a land border treaty in 1999 and Vietnam maintaining a balanced position between—and at the same time, amicable

relationships with—China and its regional rivals, the United States and Japan.

At the beginning, Vuving elaborated on the analytical method applied, stressing that instead of privileging a single level of analysis, his presentation explored how material and ideational factors at the international, domestic and individual levels interacted to produce outcomes. Therefore, he used a process-tracing and counterfactual method to investigate how and why the parties adopted actions that led to the turning points in question.



ALEXANDER VUVING MAKING HIS PRESENTATION

First, Vuving addressed the settlement of border disputes between China and Vietnam in 1999. He stated that, according to both governments, the conclusion of the two border pacts was a major contribution to the stability of Sino-Vietnamese relations and the border areas. He then addressed potential causes of this cooperation. He cited M. Taylor Fravel, who suggested that Beijing's regime insecurity had caused China's actions and that Beijing's leaders were more willing to offer concessions in exchange for cooperation. In the case of Vietnam, he cited Farvel, who maintained that what China sought was to strengthen Vietnam's socialist regime and facilitate the economic development of border areas.

He addressed the question of why China was more assertive than Vietnam in their border disputes. He argued that China not only needed a cooperative Vietnam less than Vietnam needed a cooperative China but that, more fundamentally, territory and a distance to Vietnam were given more weight than socialist solidarity in China's policy towards Vietnam and that this prioritization reflected China's grand strategy. This subsequently led him to the question of why China nevertheless agreed to a final settlement of the disputes and accepted a 50-50 deal. He argued that during a crisis in 1997 over its maritime border with China, Vietnam proved its willingness and ability to utilize the clout of the United States and ASEAN to deter China. This alarmed the Chinese

that if they were too assertive towards Vietnam, the latter would deviate from its China-centred orbit. Vuving based his argument on the fact that only three months after the crisis, Do Muoi and Jiang Zemin agreed to conclude the negotiation on the land border and the maritime border before the end of the 20th century.

In the next part of his presentation, Vuving focused on Vietnam's balancing act between China and its rivals. He argued that Vietnam tended to jump on the bandwagon of the powerful and a balanced position for Vietnam between China and the United States would not be possible without Vietnam's strategic readjustment after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. He concluded that in a broader context, this balanced position was made possible by a unique fit between three grand strategies: those of Vietnam, the United States and China.

Vuving concluded by stating that the "grand strategic fit" was in turn the result of a complex power shift that involved the protagonists' and the actors' perceptions of these shifts. He furthermore suggested that power shifts at the systemic level are perceived, presumably, through the individual level, and elaborate and transmute into worldviews at the societal level. These give rise to different grand strategies at the elite level. He concluded that these grand strategic contests are not isolated but influenced and conditioned by the interplay of strategies of major powers outside.

Discussion

Tan See Seng suggested to further elaborate on the reasons for the policy change following the 2003 Iraq War. Furthermore, he questioned the possibility of two simultaneous grand strategies.

Tan Seng Chye even questioned if it was appropriate to talk about grand strategies at all when it comes to U.S.-Vietnamese relations. Another participant raised the issue whether Vietnam considered itself being able to balance China. Furthermore, a participant raised the question of whether India's increasing interest in Southeast Asia (e.g. military alliance) may lead to a Vietnamese balancing act between India and Southeast Asia.

PROGRAMME

Wednesday, 7 March 2007

All day Arrival and check-in for foreign participants

1900–2100 Welcome reception for participants
Venue: Cafébiz, Lobby Level, Traders Hotel

Thursday, 8 March 2007

Conference Venue: The Gallery (Level 2)

0830–0900 Registration

0900–0920 Opening remarks
Kwa Chong Guan
Head (External Programmes)
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

0920–1010 **Panel One: The Origins of China's Proactive Engagement in Asia**
Presenter:
Li Mingjiang
RSIS
Moderator:
Jae Ho Chung
Seoul National University
Discussants:
Sheng Lijun
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
Chih-yu Shih
National Taiwan University

1010–1030 Coffee break

1030–1120 **Panel Two: The PLA's Role in China's Regional Security Strategy**

Presenter:
Qi Dapeng
National Defense University

Moderator:
Joseph Liow
RSIS

Discussants:
Tang Shiping
RSIS
Richard Bitzinger
RSIS

1120–1210 **Panel Three: Russia**

Presenter:
Alexander Lukin
Moscow State Institute of International Relations

Moderator:
Qi Dapeng
National Defense University

Discussants:
Leszek Buszynski
International University of Japan
Tang Shiping
RSIS

1210–1325 Lunch

1330–1420 **Panel Four: India**

Presenter:
Swaran Singh
Jawaharlal Nehru University

Moderator:
Haruko Satoh
Cambridge University

Discussants:
Rajesh Basrur
RSIS
Zhang Guihong
Fudan University

PROGRAMME

- 1420–1510 **Panel Five: Pakistan**
Presenter:
Fazal-ur-Rahman
Institute of Strategic Studies
Moderator:
Tang Shiping
RSIS
Discussants:
Swaran Singh
Jawaharlal Nehru University
Zhang Guihong
Fudan University
- 1510–1530 Coffee break
- 1530–1620 **Panel Six: The Philippines**
Presenter:
Aileen Baviera
University of the Philippines
Moderator:
Alexander Vuving
Harvard University
Discussants:
Joseph Liow
RSIS
Ho Khai Leong
Nanyang Technological University
- 1620–1710 **Panel Seven: Malaysia and Thailand**
Presenter:
Mohamed Nawab
RSIS
Joseph Liow
RSIS
Moderator:
Li Mingjiang
RSIS
Discussants:
Tan Seng Chye
RSIS
Ho Khai Leong
Nanyang Technological University
- 1900–2100 Welcome dinner
Venue: House of Peranakan Cuisine,
Meritus Negara Hotel

Friday, 9 March 2007

- 0900–0950 **Panel Eight: The Politics of China's Economic Presence in the Region: ASEAN as a Case**
Presenter:
Liang Ruobing
Xiamen University
Moderator:
Alexander Lukin
Moscow State Institute of International Relations)
Discussants:
Sarah Tong
East Asian Institute
Li Mingjiang
RSIS
- 0950–1040 **Panel Nine: South Korea**
Presenter:
Jae Ho Chung
Seoul National University
Moderator:
Liang Ruobing
Xiamen University
Discussants:
Heungkyu Kim
Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security
Tang Shiping
RSIS
- 1040–1100 Coffee break

PROGRAMME

1100–1150	Panel Ten: Japan Presenter: Haruko Satoh <i>Cambridge University</i> Moderator: Swaran Singh <i>Jawaharlal Nehru University</i> Discussants: Chih-yu Shih <i>National Taiwan University</i> Lam Peng Er <i>East Asian Institute</i>	1420–1510	Panel Twelve: Vietnam Presenter: Alexander Vuving <i>Harvard University</i> Moderator: Aileen Baviera <i>University of the Philippines</i> Discussants: Tan See Seng <i>RSIS</i> Tan Seng Chye <i>RSIS</i>
1200–1330	Lunch	1510–1540	Concluding session
1330–1420	Panel Eleven: Indonesia Presenter: Rizal Sukma <i>Centre for Strategic and International Studies</i> Moderator: Fazal-ur-Rahman <i>Pakistan Institute of Strategic Studies</i> Discussants: Leonard Sebastian <i>RSIS</i> Tan See Seng <i>RSIS</i>		

LIST OF PRESENTERS, MODERATORS, DISCUSSANTS & PARTICIPANTS

Presenters / Moderators / Discussants

1. Dr. Rajesh Basrur
Visiting Research Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue
Singapore 639798
Tel: (65) 6513 7608 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991
E-mail: israjesh@ntu.edu.sg
2. Professor Aileen Baviera
Dean, Asian Center, University of the Philippines
Romulo Hall, Magsaysay cor Guerrero St., Diliman
Quezon City
Philippines
Tel: (632) 927 0909 / Fax: (632) 920 3535
E-mail: aileen.baviera@up.edu.ph; abaviera@yahoo.com
3. Mr. Richard Bitzinger
Senior Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
Tel: (65) 6514 1904 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991
E-mail: isrbitzinger@ntu.edu.sg
4. Professor Leszek Buszynski
Graduate School of International Relations
International University of Japan
777 Kokusai-cho
Minami Uonuma-shi, Niigata-ken
Japan 949 7277
Tel: (81) 25 779 1541 / Fax: (81) 25 779 1183
E-mail: leszekbuszynski@yahoo.co.uk
5. Prof Jae Ho Chung
Professor and Chair
Department of International Relations, College of Social Sciences
Seoul National University
Seoul 151-742
Korea
Tel: (82) 2 8806 352 / Fax: (82) 2 8724 115
E-mail: cjhir@snu.ac.kr
6. Professor Heungkyu Kim
Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, MOFAT
1376-2, Seocho 2 Dong, Seocho Gu,
Seoul, #316
Korea
Tel: (82) 2 3497 7735 / Fax: (82) 2 575 5245
E-mail:hkkim63@mofat.go.kr
7. Associate Professor Ho Khai Leong
School of Humanities and Social Science
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore
Tel: (65) 6316 8741 / Fax: (65) 6794 6303
E-mail: klho@ntu.edu.sg
8. Mr. Kwa Chong Guan
Head (External Programmes)
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
Tel: (65) 6790 6975 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991
E-mail: iscgkwa@ntu.edu.sg
9. Dr. Lam Peng Er
Senior Research Fellow
East Asian Institute
National University of Singapore
469A Tower Block, #06-01, Bukit Timah Road
Singapore 259770
Tel: (65) 6516 3717 / Fax: (65) 6779 3409
E-mail: eailampe@nus.edu.sg
10. Dr. Li Mingjiang
Assistant Professor
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
Tel: (65) 6790 6836 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991
E-mail: ismjl@ntu.edu.sg
11. Dr. Liang Ruobing
Associate Professor
School of Economics, Xiamen University
Room D112, Economic Building
China
Tel: (86) 592 5429 009
E-mail: ruobingliang@gmail.com
12. Dr. Joseph Liow
Associate Professor and Head of Research
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
Tel: (65) 6790 4908 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991
E-mail: iscyliow@ntu.edu.sg
13. Dr. Alexander Lukin
Director
Center for East Asian and SCO Studies
Moscow State Institute of International Relations
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia
76 Prospekt Vernadskogo, 119454 Moscow
Russia
Tel: (7) 495 434 0078 / Fax: (7) 495 434 0078
E-mail: lukinru@yahoo.com; asia@mgimo.ru

LIST OF PRESENTERS, MODERATORS, DISCUSSANTS & PARTICIPANTS

14. Mr. Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman
Associate Research Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
Tel: (65) 6790 5979 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991
E-mail: ismawab@ntu.edu.sg
15. Colonel Qi Da-peng
Senior Fellow
Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University
A-3 Hongshankou, Haidian District, Beijing
China 100091
Tel: (86) 10 8283 1158
E-mail: bertqi1@yahoo.com.cn
16. Mr. Fazal-ur-Rahman
Director of China Study Centre,
Institute of Strategic Studies, Sector F-5/2, Islamabad
Pakistan
Tel: (92) 51 920 4423/24 / Fax: (92) 51 920 4658
E-mail: strategy@isb.paknet.com.pk; effrahman@hotmail.com
17. Ms. Haruko Satoh
Doctoral Candidate
Centre of International Studies
Cambridge University
Flat 406, Takaban 1-13-20
Meguro-ku, Tokyo 152-0004
Japan
Tel: (81) 3 3714 7792 / Fax: (81) 3 3714 8994
E-mail: hsatoh65@aol.com
18. Associate Professor Leonard Sebastian
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
Tel: (65) 6790 4402 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991
E-mail: islcsebastian@ntu.edu.sg
19. Associate Professor Swaran Singh
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
Mahrauli Road, New Delhi-110067
India
Tel: (91) 11 2612 3433 / 98 11 316503 / Fax: (91) 11 3041 0079
E-mail: drswaransingh@gmail.com; swaransingh@hotmail.com
20. Dr. Sheng Lijun
Senior Fellow
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Singapore 119614
Tel: (65) 6870 4512 / Fax: (65) 6775 6264
E-mail: sheng@iseas.edu.sg
21. Professor Chih-yu Shih
Professor of Political Science
National Taiwan University
21 Hsu Chow Road, Taipei
Taiwan 10055
Tel: (886) 2 2351 9641 / Fax: (886) 2 2341 2806
E-mail: cyshih@ntu.edu.tw
22. Dr. Rizal Sukma
Deputy Executive Director
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Jalan Tanah Abang III/23-27, Jakarta 10160
Indonesia
Tel: (62) 21 380 9637 / Fax: (62) 21 380 9641
E-mail: rsukma@csis.or.id
23. Mr. Tan Seng Chye
Senior Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
Tel: (65) 6790 4009 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991
E-mail: issctan@ntu.edu.sg
24. Dr. Tan See Seng
Assistant Professor
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
Tel: (65) 6790 4277 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991
E-mail: issstan@ntu.edu.sg
25. Dr. Sarah Tong
Assistant Professor / Research Fellow
Department of Economics, East Asian Institute
National University of Singapore
Singapore
Tel: (65) 6516 6017 / Fax: (65) 6775 2646
E-mail: eaityt@nus.edu.sg
26. Dr. Tang Shiping
Senior Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
Tel: (65) 6514 1906 / Fax: (65) 6793 2991
E-mail: issptang@ntu.edu.sg
27. Dr. Alexander Vuving
Research Fellow
Harvard University
79 John F. Kennedy St
Cambridge, MA 02138
USA
Tel: (1) 617 495 8995 / Fax: (1) 617 496 0606
E-mail: alexander_vuving@ksg.harvard.edu

LIST OF PRESENTERS, MODERATORS, DISCUSSANTS & PARTICIPANTS

28. Dr. Zhang Guihong
Professor of International Relations
Institute of International Studies
Fudan University
220 Handan Road, Shanghai
China
Tel: (86) 21 5566 4940 / Fax: (86) 21 5566 4941
E-mail: ghzhang@fudan.edu.cn; ghzhangcn@hotmail.com

Participants

29. H.E. Munshi Faiz Ahmad
High Commissioner
Bangladesh High Commission
Singapore
E-mail: bdoot@singnet.com.sg

30. Ms. Beatrice Bieger
M.Sc. Student Research Assistant
Singapore
E-mail: J060016@ntu.edu.sg

31. Ms. Jacqueline Chia
Research Officer
Ministry of Home Affairs
Singapore
E-mail: MHA_Command_Training@mha.gov.sg

32. Ms. Belinda Chng
Research Analyst
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
E-mail: ishkchng@ntu.edu.sg

33. Mr. Dong Eun Chung
Counsellor
Embassy of the Republic of Korea
Singapore
E-mail: jphua@koreaembassy.org.sg

34. Mr. Philippe Denier
Policy Officer
Delegation of the European Commission
E-mail: philippe.denier@ec.europa.eu

35. H.E. Dr. Richard Grant
High Commissioner
New Zealand High Commission
E-mail: Janine.graham@mfat.gov.nz

36. Mr. Gunawan Hadi
Student
Singapore
E-mail: GU0001DI@ntu.edu.sg

37. Mr. Tobias Heinrich
Visiting Research Associate
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
E-mail: istheinrich@ntu.edu.sg

38. Mr. Joshua Ho
Senior Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
E-mail: ishho@ntu.edu.sg

39. Mr. Gunawan Husin
Adjunct Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
E-mail: isghusin@ntu.edu.sg

40. Dr. Olga Ilkaeva
Research Fellow
Center for East Asian and SCO Studies
Moscow State Institute of International Relations
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia
76 Prospekt Vernadskogo, 119454 Moscow
Russia
Tel: (7) 495 434 0078 / Fax: (7) 495 434 0078
E-mail: oilkaeva@mail.ru

41. Ms. Sofiah Jamil
Research Analyst
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
E-mail: isssofiah@ntu.edu.sg

42. Mr. Yang Razali Kassim
Senior Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
E-mail: isyangrazali@ntu.edu.sg

43. Mr. Jeffrey Lee Keisel
Student
Singapore
E-mail: JEFF0006@ntu.edu.sg

44. Mr. Evan Abelard Laksmana
Research Analyst
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
E-mail: isevan@ntu.edu.sg

45. Mr. Jong-Kook Lee
Charge D' Affaires
Embassy of the Republic of Korea
Singapore
E-mail: jphua@koreaembassy.org.sg

LIST OF PRESENTERS, MODERATORS, DISCUSSANTS & PARTICIPANTS

46. Mr. Lew Eng Fee
Principal Research Officer
Ministry of Defence
Singapore
E-mail: quek_chwee_keow_cynthia@starnet.gov.sg
47. Mr. Herbert Lin
Research Assistant
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
E-mail: isherbertlin@ntu.edu.sg
48. H.E. Tamas Magda
Ambassador
Embassy of the Republic of Hungary
Singapore
E-mail: admhunem@singnet.com.sg
49. Dr. Viktor Mashtabei
Ambassador
Embassy of Ukraine
Singapore
E-mail: Ukremb@singnet.com.sg
50. Ms. Nadege Orban
M.Sc. Student
Singapore
E-mail: nade0001@ntu.edu.sg
51. Ms. Rowena Rivera Pangilinan
Student
Singapore
E-mail: ROWE0002@ntu.edu.sg
52. Mr. Nicholas Phan
Senior Officer
Ministry of Defence
Singapore
E-mail: quek_chwee_keow_cynthia@starnet.gov.sg
53. Mr. Daljit Singh
Senior Research Fellow
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
Singapore
E-mail: daljit@iseas.edu.sg
54. Mr. Tan Mui Siong
Student
Singapore
E-mail: H060016@ntu.edu.sg
55. Ms. Michelle Tan Yinghui
Senior Officer
Ministry of Defence
Singapore
E-mail: quek_chwee_keow_cynthia@starnet.gov.sg
56. Ms. Shulin Tay
Policy Officer
Defence Policy Office, Ministry of Defence
Singapore
E-mail: Tay_shulin@mindef.gov.sg
57. Mr. Tay Theng Hwee
Student
Singapore
E-mail: TAYT0010@ntu.edu.sg
58. Professor Geoffrey Till
Visiting Senior Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore
E-mail: isgtill@ntu.edu.sg
59. H.E. Daniel Woker
Ambassador
Embassy of Switzerland
Singapore
E-mail: sin.vertretung@eda.admin.ch

ABOUT THE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was established in January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University. RSIS' mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia-Pacific. To accomplish this mission, it will:

- Provide a rigorous professional graduate education with a strong practical emphasis,
- Conduct policy-relevant research in defence, national security, international relations, strategic studies and diplomacy,
- Build a global network of like-minded professional schools.

Graduate Training in International Affairs

RSIS offers an exacting graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The Master of Science (MSc) degree programmes in Strategic Studies, International Relations, and International Political Economy are distinguished by their focus on the Asia-Pacific, the professional practice of international affairs, and the cultivation of academic depth. About 130 students, the majority from abroad, are enrolled in these programmes. A small, select Ph.D. programme caters to advanced students whose interests match those of specific faculty members.

Research

RSIS research is conducted by five components: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies which is RSIS' predecessor (IDSS, 1996), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR, 2004), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS, 2006), the Centre for the Advanced Study of Regionalism and Multilateralism (CASRM, 2007); and the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia, 2007). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. RSIS also has the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, which brings distinguished scholars and practitioners to participate in the work of the school.

International Collaboration

Collaboration with other professional schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS will initiate links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools.



S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

S. Rajaratnam School Of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798

TEL 65-6790-6982 | FAX 65-6793-2991 | EMAIL wwwrsis@ntu.edu.sg | WEBSITE www.rsis.edu.sg